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TORTS: NARROWING SCOPE OF THE PARENTAL
IMMUNITY DOCTRINE
I. INTRODUCTION
Hewlett v. George," an 1891 Mississippi decision, was the first ju-
dicial declaration of the doctrine of parental immunity in the United
States. - In that case, an unemancipated minor brought suit to recover
for personal injuries resulting from being falsely imprisoned at her
mother's direction. The court held that because of the parent-child
relationship, "no such action as this can be maintained. ' '3 The ra-
tionale enunciated in this opinion remains the dominant reasoning of
courts today: "The peace of society, and of the families composing
society, and a sound public policy . . . forbid to the minor child a
right to appear in court in the assertion of a claim to civil redress
.... "4 No supporting precedent, at common law or otherwise, ex-
isted for the doctrine,: except by analogy to the domestic tranquillity
argument traditionally used to bar tort actions between spouses.6
Subsequent judicial development has narrowed the parental im-
munity doctrine's original sweep, through the familiar piecemeal
process of limitation and exception. The purpose of this note is to
discuss the present scope of the doctrine and to make a critical evalua-
tion of its present and future worth in the service of its purported
objective.
The Hewlett case laid the broadest possible foundation for the grant-
ing of parental immunity in suits brought by a minor child. For ex-
ample, a 1903 Tennessee case7 held that a child was unable to sue her
father and stepmother for cruel treatment. Two years later a Wash-
1. 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891). For cases prior to the Hewlett case, see Bird
v. Black, 5 La. Ann. 189 (1850); Faulk v. Faulk, 23 Tex. 653 (1859).
2. While characterization of the Hewlett decision as the foundation of the
parental immunity doctrine is presumptive, subsequent decisions have either ex-
pressly or impliedly attributed the doctrine's origin in the United States to that
case. Of parental immunity it has been said: "All the authorities are modern.
What may be termed the earlier ones, those prior to 1891 [the date of the Hewlett
case] are meager, conflicting, and obscure." McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in
Domestic Relations, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 1030, 1059 (1930).
3. 68 Miss. at 711, 9 So. at 887.
4. Ibid.
5. The presence of a common law basis for the doctrine is disputed. The follow-
ing sources indicate that little or no common law background exists: Dunlap v.
Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 354, 150 Atl. 905, 906 (1930); Annot., 19 A.L.R.2d 425
(1951) ; Prosser, Torts 675 (2d ed. 1955).
6. See discussion in 34 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 333, 336 (1956).
7. McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664.
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
ington court denied redress to a child raped by her father,8 despite the
fact that domestic harmony had obviously been destroyed.0 However,
by the end of the 1920's a definite judicial trend assailing both the
value and the rationale of the parental immunity doctrine had taken
shape.10 Recognizing that indiscriminate application of the rule might
not always be just, various courts demonstrated a growing inclination
to narrow the scope of the doctrine. This laudable propensity, though
continuing to grow, has not culminated in any uniform or clearly de-
fined answer to the central problem involved-that of balancing the
injured child's need for redress against society's interest in maintain-
ing family harmony and discipline. The Hewlett rule baldly denying
relief admittedly recognizes only one interest and totally disregards
the other. Whether it truly fosters the interest which it does recognize
is an inquiry which seems to have escaped the attention of far too
many courts.
II. THE MAJORITY VIEW-PARENTAL IMMUNITY WITH EXCEPTIONS
The parental immunity rule has been attacked along two lines. One
discredits its basic rationale and disposes of the rule entirely;1" the
other applies the rule, but creates exceptions when variant fact situa-
tions warrant. The latter approach is the prevailing one among courts
today. The majority view is well typified by the following statement
in Baker v. Baker, 2 a 1953 Missouri case: "A parent is not liable to
an unemancipated minor child for injuries sustained through the
negligence of the parent while acting within parental authority or
duty." 3 Different results are reached depending on the courts' varied
interpretations of the emphasized words.
8. Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 Pac. 788 (1905).
9. "There seems to be some reason in this argument [that any harmonious
relations existing have been disturbed], but it overlooks the fact that courts, in
determining their jurisdiction or want of jurisdiction, rely upon certain uniform
principles of law, and, if it be once established that a child has a right to sue a
parent for a tort, there is no practical line of demarcation which can be drawn.
." 37 Wash. at 244, 79 Pac. at 788-89.
10. See, e.g., Mesite v. Kirchenstein, 109 Conn. 77, 145 At. 753 (1929) ; Elias v.
Collins, 237 Mich. 175, 211 N.W. 88 (1926); Taubert v. Taubert, 103 Minn. 247,
114 N.W. 763 (1908); Small v. Morrison, 185 N.C. 577, 118 S.E. 12 (1923);
Matarese v. Matarese, 47 R.I. 131, 131 Atl. 198 (1925); Wick v. Wick, 192 Wis.
260, 212 N.W. 787 (1927).
11. Only a few cases attempt totally to discredit and dismiss parental immunity.
See Signs v. Signs, 156 Ohio St. 566, 103 N.E.2d 743 (1952) ; dissenting opinions
in Small v. Morrison, and Wick v. Wick note 10 supra.
12. 364 Mo. 453, 263 S.W.2d 29 (1953).
13. Id. at 456, 263 S.W.2d at 31. (Emphasis added.)
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1. Emancipation.
The interpretation of "emancipation" has been a decisive factor in
numerous cases. The Hewlett case itself, while denying recovery by the
child, conceded that "if, by her marriage, the relation of parent and
child had been finally dissolved .. .then it may be that the child
could successfully maintain an action against the parent for personal
injuries."'1 When a child is emancipated, family harmony and disci-
pline no longer present forceful public policy considerations. Further,
although the possibility of collusive suits under such circumstances is
clearly a risk, the danger of collusion is real only if the parent is in-
sured. This danger will be treated in detail in later portions of this
note dealing specifically with insurance.', The following limitations
have been established which prevent suits by obviously unemancipated
children: a general presumption against emancipation,16 allocation of
the burden of proof of emancipation to the party alleging it, T the rule
that age twenty-one is not ipso facto emancipation,' 8 and the rule that
only complete emancipation will remove the immunity.19 Decisions
turning upon standards of emancipation well illustrate the judicial
process of inclusion and exclusion in this area. In one case20 a nineteen
year old daughter held outside employment and lived at home, paying
board to her family. In a negligence suit against her father, the court
held that the evidence was not sufficient to establish emancipation.
Yet, in another case" in which a seventeen year old child was employed
away from home, paying neither room nor board to live at home, the
court held the evidence sufficient to make a case for jury consideration.
These results show that the courts' predispositions to allow or deny
recovery, though perhaps based in reality on other considerations, may
be articulated in terms of "emancipation." Unless emancipation is
more clearly defined, results obtained by these courts will remain
unpredictable.
2. Negligence Cases.
Most courts have barred a child's recovery in negligence suits
against a parent. Although earlier cases applied the parental immu-
nity doctrine even when injuries were characterized as willful and
14. 68 Miss. at 711, 9 So. at 887.
15. Text at notes 36-48 and 56-68 infra.
16. See Bulloch v. Bulloch, 45 Ga. App. 1, 2, 163 S.E. 708, 709 (1932).
17. See Brumfield v. Brumfield, 194 Va. 577, 580, 74 S.E.2d 170, 173 (1953).
18. See Goldstein v. Goldstein, 4 N.J. Misc. 711, 712, 134 Atl. 184 (Sup. Ct.
1926).
19. See Cafaro v. Cafaro, 118 N.J.L. 123, 127, 191 Atl. 472, 474 (1937). Also,
see generally on emancipation, Note, 9 S.C.L.Q. 269 (1957).
20. Wurth v. Wurth, 313 S.W.2d 161 (Mo. Ct. App. 1958).
21. Wood v. Wood, 135 Conn. 280, 63 A.2d 586 (1948).
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wanton,2 2 today, with few exceptions, 23 courts permit minors to sue
parents for willful and wanton conduct. 4 Two groups of cases, in-
volving excessive punishment and automobile accidents, comprise most
of the litigation concerning wanton and willful conduct. In the exces-
sive punishment cases the majority of courts concede the parent's dis-
cretionary right to administer disciplinary measures, but only if
accompanied by proper motives of duty.25 Courts will tolerate parental
error of judgment in excessive punishment cases, but will not excuse
malice,26 and the determination of what is reasonable punishment in a
particular case is a jury question.27 One court has stated, "There is
no such thing as reasonable punishment from a malicious motive. 1 21
Most automobile accident cases of significance in the parental immu-
nity area are based on allegations of drunken driving, excessive
speed,29 or both. A court's determination that the parent's acts in such
a case exceeded ordinary negligent conduct is sufficient to eliminate
the parental immunity. At least one court has forthrightly stated
that the rule should be modified to allow recovery for a willful or
malicious tort.30 The rule of the punishment and auto accident cases
is equally applicable to the occasional bizarre case like Mahnke v.
Moore,31 in which a five year old girl was allowed to recover damages
sustained by watching her father murder her mother and then take
his own life.
Thus, courts have allowed recovery by a minor in instances where
the parent's conduct has transcended negligence. This is clearly desir-
able in view of society's strong interest in permitting children to re-
22. See Hewlett v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891); McKelvey v. Mc-
Kelvey, 111 Tenn. 338, 77 S.W. 664 (1903); Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79
Pac. 788 (1905).
23. E.g., Chastain v. Chastain, 50 Ga. App. 241, 177 S.E. 828 (1934); Cook v.
Cook, 232 Mo. App. 994, 124 S.W.2d 675 (1939) (foster parent).
24. E.g., Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1950); Cowgill v. Boock,
189 Ore. 282, 218 P.2d 445 (1950).
25. Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 430, 289 P.2d 218, 224 (1955) ; Cowgill v.
Boock, 189 Ore. 282, 301, 218 P.2d 445, 453 (1950). See generally, Reeve, Domestic
Relations 357 (4th ed. 1888).
26. Reeve, op. cit. supra note 25, at 357.
27. Clasen v. Pruhs, 69 Neb. 278, 284, 95 N.W. 640, 642 (1903).
28. Haycraft v. Grigsby, 88 Mo. App. 354, 359 (1901). This case involved a
schoolteacher and a child, rather than a parent-child relationship. A teacher, how-
ever, is one who acts in loco parentis and for the purposes of punishment has the
same immunity as a parent.
29. E.g., Buttrum v. Buttrum, 98 Ga. App. 226, 105 S.E.2d 510 (1958) ; Hender-
son v. Henderson, 169 N.Y.S.2d 106 (Sup. Ct. 1957); Cowgill v. Boock, 189 Ore.
282, 218 P.2d 445 (1950).
30. Cowgill v. Boock, 189 Ore. 282, 301, 218 P.2d 445, 453 (1950).
31. 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1950).
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cover in cases of parents' aggravated or reprehensible conduct.
Further, in the punishment cases, the reason for granting a parent
immunity from suit is eradicated, since there could be little harmony
in a home beset with fears of wanton or malicious treatment.
3. Parental Authority and Duty.
Finally, the majority view as expressed in the Baker case32 states
the limitation that parental immunity applies only to a suit for injuries
sustained while the parent was acting within parental authority and
duty. However, a child may circumvent this limitation and success-
fully sue his parent if certain factors are present. First, there must
be a consensual relationship between parent and child, in addition to
the parent-child relation itself. This extra-parental relationship may
arise in business situations, as where a father employs his son, and also
in non-business cases, as where a mother drives the family car with
her child as passenger. Because the relationship must be consensual,
this classification excludes the situation where a parent-driver injures
a child-pedestrian, since there is no consent. Another factor which
undoubtedly has been an important cause for abrogation of parental
immunity in this area has been the existence of personal or business
liability insurance.:- A study of all cases in which a child brought a
negligence action against an insured parent reveals twenty decisions
to date which may be categorized into four groups: (1) a dual rela-
tionship plus personal liability insurance,3 4 (2) a dual relationship
plus liability insurance on behalf of a business, 35 (3) no dual relation-
32. Text at note 13 supra.
33. As Prosser says, "Still others [courts] have allowed recovery where the
child is injured in the course of a business, rather than a personal activity of the
parent; and here they have been visibly influenced by the presence or possibility
of liability insurance." Prosser, Torts 677 (2d ed. 1955). (Emphasis added.)
Three of the five cases found which allow recovery do so because of the insurance.
The above statement may indicate that the courts are more influenced by the
presence or possibility of insurance than the formal opinions explicitly indicate.
34. The following cases are so categorized: Villaret v. Villaret, 169 F.2d 677
(D.C. Cir. 1948); Owens v. Auto Mut. Indem. Co., 235 Ala. 9, 177 So. 133 (1937);
Mesite v. Kirchenstein, 109 Conn. 77, 145 At. 753 (1929); Elias v. Collins, 237
Mich. 175, 211 N.W. 88 (1926); Lund v. Olson, 183 Minn. 515, 237 N.W. 188
(1931); Levesque v. Levesque, 99 N.H. 147, 106 A.2d 563 (1954); Damiano v.
Damiano, 6 N.J.Misc. 849, 143 Atl. 3 (Cir. Ct. 1928); Small v. Morrison, 185
N.C. 577, 118 S.E. 12 (1923) ; Parks v. Parks, 390 Pa. 287, 135 A.2d 65 (1957) ;
Norfolk So. R. Co. v. Gretakis, 162 Va. 597, 174 S.E. 841 (1934) ; Schwenkhoff v.
Farmers Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 6 Wis. 2d 44, 93 N.W.2d 867 (1959); Munsert v.
Farmers Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 229 Wis. 581, 281 N.W. 671 (1938); Ball v. Ball,
73 Wyo. 29, 269 P.2d 302 (1954). These are all host-passenger cases, none of
which involved common carriers.
35. The following cases are so categorized: Belleson v. Skilbeck, 185 Minn. 537,
242 N.W. 1 (1932) (passenger-carrier) ; Taubert v. Taubert, 103 Minn. 247, 114
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ship, but personal liability insurance, 36 and (4) no dual relationship,
but liability insurance on behalf of a business3T
Thirteen of the twenty cases fall in the first category. All involve
automobile liability insurance in guest-host type situations and none
allows recovery. Of the five cases in the second category, three allow
recovery. Two of these involve a guest-host relationship and the other
a master-servant relationship; the two denying recovery are also split
between these two relationships. Thus, the only possible distinction
between the cases in this category allowing recovery and the cases in
the first category which deny recovery is the type of insurance. Pos-
sibly the courts feel that a suit by a child against his parents in a
business capacity is less likely to contravene public policy by disrupt-
ing family harmony. Only one case is present in each of the last two
categories. Again where business insurance is present, recovery is
allowed; where there is personal insurance, recovery is denied. There-
fore, it may be concluded that if both business insurance and a dual
relationship are present, some courts will allow recovery. Personal
insurance with or without a dual relationship will not serve to elimi-
nate immunity. One case in which business insurance was present, but
a dual relationship was not, allowed recovery but specifically excluded
insurance as a reason for decision.38
The three cases of the second category which allow recovery deserve
special notice to indicate the significance attached to the insurance
factor. In Worrell v. Worrell,39 there was a guest-host relationship and
business insurance. The court in allowing recovery interpreted the
state's compulsory insurance statute as a legislative declaration of
public policy superseding other public interests, i.e., family harmony.
In Lusk v. Lusk40 and Dunlap v. Dunlap,41 the courts based recovery
squarely on the insurance factor. The court in the former, a guest-host
case, said it was not persuaded by "nice vocational distinctions," since
the suit was still essentially between parent and child. However, the
court said further: "A different situation arises where the parent is
N.W. 763 (1908) (master-servant); Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 Atl. 905
(1930) (master-servant); Worrell v. Worrell, 174 Va. 11, 4 S.E.2d 343 (1939)
(passenger-carrier); Lusk v. Lusk, 113 W. Va. 17, 166 S.E. 538 (1932) (pas-
senger-carrier).
36. See Baker v. Baker, 364 Mo. 453, 263 S.W.2d 29 (1953). In this case the
father backed his automobile over his fifteen month old infant.
37. See Signs v. Signs, 156 Ohio St. 566, 103 N.E.2d 743 (1952). Here a gas
pump on the business premises of the father exploded with consequent injury to the
child who was playing there.
38. Ibid.
39. Supra note 35.
40. Supra note 35.
41. Supra note 35.
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protected by insurance in his vocational capacity."' The Dunlap case
was a master-servant situation, and the court in allowing redress said:
"There is evidence that the father understood that he had done what-
ever was necessary to make him accountable to his son for failure to
perform a master's duty. His taking out insurance against such lia-
bility is competent evidence of that fact.14
Three recent cases indicate that the immunity doctrine is being
subjected to attack on broader grounds. In Borst v. Borst,44 a Wash-
ington case not classified above because no insurance was involved, a
child while playing in the street was run over by its father. At the
time, the father was driving his company's truck on company business.
In refuting all the usual arguments for parental immunity, the court
said: "The reasons for the rule do not exist, and the mantle of immu-
nity therefore disappears, where the tort is committed by the parent
in a non-parental transaction."15 By way of dictum the court implied
that it would make no difference whether or not there was insurance.
Thus, at least in Washington, no dual relationship is needed to destroy
parental immunity. Moreover, in Signs v. Signs,4 3 the case placed
above in the fourth category, recovery was allowed though there was
no dual relationship, as the child was hurt while playing near its
father's gas pump at his gas station. It may be inferred that insurance
was present in the case, but this fact loses significance in view of the
court's declaration that insurance had no effect upon the cause of
action and that the issue should be solved irrespective of insurance.
Finally, in Brenneeke v. Kilpatrick,41 a 1960 Missouri Supreme Court
case, the court held that a child may sue a deceased parent's estate,
citing a long list of husband and wife cases as indirect support, and
arriving at its decision by saying that the reason for the parental
immunity rule failed because family harmony cannot be impaired
when the parent has died. Nowhere does the court consider that the
plaintiff's recovery might cause family disharmony because of its con-
sequent diminution of the inheritable estate. The court denominated
the bar procedural rather than substantive and referred to insurance
42. Lusk v. Lusk, 113 W. Va. 17, 19, 166 S.E. 588, 540 (1932.
43. Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 364, 150 Atl. 905, 911 (1930).
44. 41 Wash. 2d 642, 251 P.2d 149 (1952).
45. Id. at 657, 251 P.2d at 156.
46. 156 Ohio St. 556, 103 N.E.2d 743 (1952). The inference that insurance was
present in the case is based partially on the citation of the Signs case in Borst v.
Borst, supra note 44, where in reference to the Signs case, it is said: "Although
public liability insurance was present . . . ." 41 Wash. 2d at 649, 251 P.2d at 152.
Further in the Signs case itself, the court said: "[W]e are of the opinion that the
problem presented to us should be solved irrespective of the question of such
insurance .... ." 156 Ohio St. at 573, 103 N.E.2d at 747.
47. No. 47, 577, Mo. Sup. Ct., March 14, 1960.
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as being immaterial. A strong dissent in the case argued that if the
court wanted to limit parental immunity, it should repudiate the doc-
trine completely, rather than create artificial distinctions. The dissent
also found disconcerting the majority's statement that the cause of
action survived, but the immunity did not.48
It is believed that the above three cases demonstrate a progressive
step toward abrogation of parental immunity. Until this final goal is
attained, the cases which allow an injured minor to recover when
insurance is present seem wholly justifiable, for if the insurer pays,
domestic tranquillity is not disturbed and the reason for the immunity
fails.
III. REASONS FOR MAJORITY'S ADHERENCE TO THE RULE
Although the doctrine of parental immunity has been narrowed by
limitation and exception, the vast majority of courts still adhere to it
tenaciously. Four reasons stand out to explain this tenacity.
1. The Evidentiary Rule Denying Admissibility of Insurance.
Most courts maintain a strict rule excluding evidence of insurance."
Consequently, it is arguable that juries will be reluctant to grant a
child recovery against his parent for fear that the parent is not in-
sured. However, in a suit by a minor when insurance is not present,
the suit itself will reflect current family strife. Therefore, the ration-
ale underlying the parental immunity rule should fail and hence the
rule should fail. On the other hand, if insurance is present a recovery
cannot produce disruption of family harmony. Further, the presence
of insurance can often be made known to the jury either through voir
dire examination of prospective jurors or in questioning of witnesses 0
In such instances the rules of evidence denying admissibility of in-
surance are specious, for when the fact of insurance becomes known
the jury will almost always consider it.
2. Partial Indemnification Will Not Assure Harmony.
Some courts maintain that since the indemnification provided by
insurance may not cover the entire judgment, the family finances will
be depleted and harmony will be threatened.". This argument was
48. Judge Eager, on pages 2-3 of his dissent said, "We believe, however, that
in such a tort as the present one an immediate disability is imposed upon the right
of action; that this attaches to the right and that it is permanent in nature. If
the right of action survives, it survives only with the disability attached."
49. 2 Wigmore, Evidence § 282a, at 133 (3d ed. 1940).
50. Ratner, Insurance: The Forbidden Word, 3 Kan. L. Rev. 328 (1955).
51. See, e.g., Rambo v. Rambo, 195 Ark. 832, 114 S.W.2d 468 (1938) ; Luster v.
Luster, 299 Mass. 480, 13 N.E.2d 438 (1938).
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sensibly discredited in the Dunlap case, 2 on the ground that liability
greater than the amount of insurance would be rare. Further, even if
the parent should become liable for the uninsured portion of the judg-
ment, the payment of a substantial part of the damages by the insur-
ance company would tend to minimize any disruptive influence.
i. Danger of Collusion.
Many courts argue that fraud and collusion will inevitably result
from any rule that allows recovery when the parent is insured.5 3 How-
ever, the research of one court "failed to reveal any case upholding
the immunity rule which has actually relied upon this argument."5 4
The same court noted that the arguments of public policy based on
family harmony and the collusion argument are mutually exclusive. A
family could scarcely be disrupted by a suit it had cooperated in
initiating; thus, the use of both arguments is contradictory. As an-
other case indicated,5; rather than prevent redress through fear of
collusion, the courts should have faith in the efficacy of judicial pro-
cesses to weed out fraudulently collusive suits from meritorious ones.
Should this process fail and the problem become serious, the legisla-
tures could abolish redress as has been done in guest-host motorist
statutes2' Similarly, liability insurance companies could protect them-
selves by clauses precluding recovery in parent-child actions.
4. hwsurance Cannot Create Liability When It Does Not Otherwise
Exist.
Perhaps the most significant objection to abolishing the parental
immunity rule is that mere issuance of a liability insurance policy
creates no cause of action when no cause of action would exist in the
absence of insurance.57 The validity of such an argument hinges upon
the relation of insurance to the cause of action. By one analysis, paren-
tal immunity is taken to mean that the parent owes the child no duty.
Absent a duty, there can be no liability or recovery. If the introduction
of insurance permits the child to recover, no conclusion can be drawn
but that insurance has created the duty and consequent liability. But
52. Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 At. 905 (1930).
53. See, e.g., Villaret v. Villaret, 169 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1948); Luster v.
Luster, 299 Mass. 480, 13 N.E.2d 438 (1938); Parks v. Parks, 390 Pa. 287, 135
A.2d 65 (1937).
54. Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash. 2d 642, 652, 251 P.2d 149, 154 (1952).
55. Rozell v. Rozell, 281 N.Y. 106, 22 N.E.2d 254 (1939).
56. See Prosser, Torts § 77 (2d ed. 1955).
57. See, e.g., Villaret v. Villaret, 169 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1948); Rambo v.
Rambo, 195 Ark. 832, 114 S.W.2d 468 (1938) ; Norfolk So. R. Co. v. Gretalds, 162
Va. 597, 174 S.E. 841 (1934).
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of course insurance cannot create original liability, so courts accepting
the "no duty" analysis are consistent in denying recovery. By another
approach, in an ordinary negligence case the parent would owe a
duty to anyone; thus there is a duty to the child who is injured. If
the duty is breached, there is liability, but no recovery, because the
courts have created the defense of parental immunity. If insurance
is added in this analysis, and recovery allowed, the conclusion cannot
be that insurance has created liability or duty, as both were already
present. Insurance has simply removed immunity, and has restored
the liability. This is the common understanding of the function of
insurance. The court in the Dunlap case recognized the already ex-
isting duty, stating: "It is always to be borne in mid that denial of
recovery has not been put upon the ground that the parent was not a
wrongdoer."58 Further, the court said insurance does not create lia-
bility, rather it "removes a barrier to the enforcement of a right.'"
The second analysis appears more cogent and logical, for courts ac-
cepting it can decide cases uninfluenced by metaphysical fears that
they are creating a duty by the use of insurance.
Some courts unfortunately have shifted the burden of deciding
what effect insurance should have to the legislature. 6 The legislature,
however, did not create the parental immunity doctrine. "The doctrine
of parental immunity . . . was created by the courts. It is especially
for them to interpret and modify that doctrine to correspond with
prevalent considerations of public policy and social needs.",,,
IV. CONCLUSION
There are three possible futures for the parental immunity doctrine:
(1) Immunity could be reinstated in the completeness of Hewlett v.
George. However, as previously indicated, an all-pervasive parental
immunity rule would unnecessarily and arbitrarily deny relief to
minors in all manner of suits against parents. (2) The present course
by which the broad immunity rule has been narrowed by limitation and
exception could be continued. But this has resulted in a highly un-
predictable, cumbersome, and impractical body of law. (3) Immunity
might be totally abrogated. This is the most logical course of action
if it can be achieved without impairing family harmony. An analysis
of each of the following four factual situations in which a child might
sue his parent indicates that abolition of the parental immunity rule
would not lead to any substantial impairment of family harmony. In
58. Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 362, 150 Atl. 905, 910 (1930).
59. Id. at 367, 150 Atl. at 912.
60. See Elias v. Collins, 237 Mich. 175, 211 N.W. 88 (1926); Levesque v.
Levesque, 99 N.H. 147, 106 A.2d 563 (1954).
61. Nudd v. Matsoukas, 7 Ill. 2d 608, 619, 131 N.E.2d 525, 531 (1956).
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the first case the child has questionable or ulterior motives and the
parent has faithfully discharged his duties. The initiation of the suit
per se indicates a lack of family harmony, and the immunity rule is
without any useful purpose. In the second case, the parent has failed
to fulfill his duty, and the child brings the suit in good faith. Here
again the very initiation of the suit indicates a lack of harmony, al-
though in this case the parent, not the child, is responsible for disrup-
tion of the family. In the third case there is collusion between the child
and the parent, usually because the parent is insured. Since collusion
is the product of harmony, the reason for application of the immunity
rule once again fails. If recovery is denied, it should not be articulated
upon the grounds of parental immunity but rather because protection
of the insurer is desired. In the fourth case, both the parent and the
child act in good faith. In reality, this situation will arise only when
there is insurance. Here the fact of good faith and family harmony
obviates the need for immunity. Should suits within either of the last
two classes become too prevalent, the remedy lies with the legislature.
It thus seems clear that in all these cases abrogation of the immunity
doctrine would have no adverse effect on family harmony and disci-
pline.
In consideration of the fact that the primary justification of im-
munity is its purported tendency to protect family harmony, and in
view of its demonstrated failure to do this, the doctrine has nothing
left to recommend it. The limiting rule enunciated in the Baker case
and the possible use of insurance to abrogate immunity do manifest
progress; however, such rules merely show the doctrine to be in a
transitional stage. Only through complete abolition of the immunity
doctrine will courts achieve the most desirable results.
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